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Abstract 
Although not all scholars are willing to recognize it, "risk" is a real philosophical category. However, it is necessary to 
distinguish risk from danger. The danger is something defined and arranged by reason. So we can face it and we can 
defend ourselves from it. The risk is in the background: it remains beyond rational awareness. The analysis of the 
etymology of risk leads us to the Arab-Byzantine era. The Greek language instead possessed the word kindynos, in which 
the thing or the action you want to experiment is probably hidden. For this reason, risk and courage are frequently 
combined. Probably, we can catch the essence of Western civilization in the game between risk and reason. The 
foundation of this is in Greek culture: from Homer to Plato and Aristotle. Greek tragedy is the place where "risk" appears 
conjugated to destiny. 
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Risk or Danger? 
Many philosophical concepts today are used in a 
blurry way because they are employed in the common 
language without paying particular attention to the 
necessary nuances. Their application becomes superficial 
and therefore inadequate. In summary, comparing the 
language and the meaning of words is an important task 
of philosophy: the philosopher has to analyze those words 
that convey basic concepts, in particular those that may 
imply decisions and actions.  
 
The concept of "risk" is central to the world and to 
modern society. Already in 1986 Ulrich Beck, in the book 
Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, 
began to investigate its traits, starting from assumptions 
of a primarily sociological / anthropological nature. 
However, risk is a concept that seems to have taken on a 
sufficiently precise definition only in the late period1 and 
which even today does not appear so unequivocally 
connoted as to be elevated to an authentic philosophical 
category [1]. 
 
As regards the etymological side, according to the 
linguistic lexical attestations, we must refer to the Arab-
Byzantine environment. It is indeed in the phase of the 
Arab expansion in the Mediterranean that the term rizq 
(Arabic) and rizikòn (Greek-Byzantine) is used to indicate 
the silver pay of the mercenary soldier. He is in fact the 
"luck soldier", the ἀνὴρ τοῦ ῥιζικοῦ, who owes his life to 
                                                             
1Luhmann N (1991) Risk: A Sociological Theory (Communication and 
Social Order). De Gruyter, Berlin-New York, believes that the modern 
meaning of "risk" has been affirmed, in a clear way, only in the medieval 
period. 
Conceptual Paper 
Volume 1 Issue 1 
      Received Date: July 31, 2018 
   Published Date: August 15, 2018 
         Philosophy & Epistemology International Journal 
 
Maso S. The Philosophical Category of "Risk". Philos Epistemol Int J 2018, 1(1): 000102.              Copyright© Maso S. 
 
2 
"fate" and "destiny" (* to riziko)2 and which constitutes 
the means often used by "fate" and "destiny" to decide the 
life of other men [2-6]. The Neo-Latin word risicum 
descends directly and ends up translated into all modern 
European languages, meaning, on the one hand, that 
which opposes security; on the other, the act of courage 
or boasting of those who deal with something of which 
they don’t know the limits or characteristics. On the other 
hand, it is probable that the etymology that refers to the 
Latin resecare should be rejected, which would introduce 
the subjective perspective into the concept of "risk", in 
which there is someone who "cuts", who "decides" 
something, causing irreversible and unpredictable 
consequences, but of which he still bears the 
responsibility. 
 
Danger, risk, adventure, and hazard: today all are 
words and concepts that contribute to define the very 
meaning of "risk". One wonders, however, about the 
convenience of isolating them from one another, since the 
application of the term "risk," to the most diverse spheres 
of modern specialist sciences (from economics to the 
medicine or assurance or mathematics) now highlights 
one or the other meaning. In this way the value of the 
term with respect to its original comprehension would 
also be significantly rejected. However, the frequency of 
expressions such as "being in danger of life" and "running 
the risk of dying" appears interesting: synonymic use 
seems to prevail, since the exact situation seems to have 
been intended. Furthermore the use of the "risk and 
danger" hendiadys ends up, on the one hand, to confirm 
the ancient complexity and comprehension of the term 
"risk"; on the other, to justify the tendency, common in 
modern languages, to confuse the original distinct 
valences of the two distinct words.  
 
Today it seems that "risk" and "danger" coincide. 
However, I believe that some polarity between the 
various meanings of "risk" and "danger" can still be 
highlighted. 
 
The Latin periculum is related to the verb periclitor, 
which refers to the idea of "trying something", of 
"grappling" and, at the same time, of "running a danger". 
                                                             
2Despite some perplexities on the part of linguists, this would seem to be 
the most probable reconstruction of the history of the word. Seead loc.: 
Ernout A. - Meillet A. 19794 Dictionnaire Etymologique de la langue latine. 
Histoire des mots. Klincksieck, Paris; Chantraine P. (1983) Dictionnaire 
étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots. Klincksieck, Paris 
(or. ed. 1968); Cortelazzo M. - Zolli P. (1979-1985) Dizionario 
etimologico della lingua italiana. Zanichelli, Bologna; De Vaan M. (2008) 
Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the Other Italic Languages. Brill, 
Leiden-Boston; Beekes R. & Beek L. van (2010) Etymological Dictionary 
of Greek, voll. 1-2. Leiden-Boston, Brill. 
In the background, there is the Greek word that indicates 
the concept of "test", "experiment": πεῖρα. Hence peritus 
will be the one who has had some experience (ἐμπειρία), 
who took a certain risk in doing it and then became 
"expert". 
 
Along the way, Luhmann attempts a first 
disambiguation between risk and danger, perceiving a 
sort of asymmetry between the two concepts, so that 
"risk" would indicate a concrete case in which the ability 
to "decide" would come into play, where we would simply 
be "exposed" to danger. 
 
Unlike Luhmann, I instead propose3 to distinguish 
between risk and danger with reference to their different 
relationship to the possibility of insisting on something 
"determined" [7]. Thus, the "risk" refers to an extremely 
broader concept: to something so "indeterminate" that 
escapes the control of rationality; the "danger", on the 
other hand, is nothing other than the single form in which 
the "risk" is transformed, in a rationally circumscribed 
way. 
 
In line with this proposal, we can also disambiguate 
risk and danger with respect to the way in which they 
present themselves and/or are perceived by the human 
subject. Let us take into consideration the case of a 
DANGEROUS PATH and a HIGH-RISK BEHAVIOUR. 
 
A "dangerous path" implies that the objective 
insecurity (i) of an X route (T) is made clear by the 
decision (d) of acting (a) by a certain subject S.  
 
However the acknowledgement of the T insecurity (= 
Ti) is not possible without an intervention (a) put into 
effect (d) by S. Practically Ti  Sdat, where the exponent 
refers to the moment when it takes place d+a on the part 
of S. The dangerousness may always be there, but the 
subject is at risk (faces DANGER and shows its existence) 
only thanks to a temporary decision.  
 
On the contrary, a "high-risk behavior" B (behavior in 
which the subject plays with instability and puts its own 
security at risk: B=da+i) does not expect any specific 
intervention which, in a given time, allows the outbreak of 
potential dangerousness. It already coincides with 
dangerousness because B  S without any further time 
variable goes beyond the fact of belonging. It is 
dangerousness in act.  
 
What is dangerous (in the example: Ti) in theory might 
not reveal itself because an intervention of S is not certain 
                                                             
3See Maso S (2006) Fondements philosophiques du risque. L’Harmattan, 
Paris, pp.17-37. 
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and could never be put into effect. But what is risky (in the 
example: B) immediately reflects the dangerous side of 
that way of acting that can belong to S. This without 
further determinations that are not originated by the fact 
of being S and therefore necessarily of being able to 
decide acting (in fact S  B by definition: a subject is not 
real if he does not have the possibility of deciding to act 
and therefore to deal with instability). Furthermore: if it is 
possible that something dangerous does not appear this 
way (this happens when S does not grasp distinctive 
features of what stands in front of him: Ti  Sdat, or T  
Sdat), is unimaginable that what is risky is not warned as 
dangerous too. Since in fact B  T (where T does not 
necessarily appear in his instability Ti), it is B (which by 
definition is da+i) that has the responsibility of leading 
instability. In short, it will be the subject who risks (in fact 
S  B) who must agree whether the danger of the 
contents (a) of his own decisions (d) are detectable or not. 
In a sense we can therefore consider irrelevant the T 
instability (Ti), given that there is the original one of B 
that involves inevitably also T. In fact, many gestures of 
our daily lives are not dangerous, such as walking, 
caressing someone, making breakfast, writing a text, but 
they too can become dangerous if the emphasis move in 
the direction of the subject. For reasons all to be clarified 
but however belonging to its essence, the subject may 
deem dangerous even walking, caressing a person, 
making breakfast, writing a text(i.e. the instability may 
thus be noticed and therefore the danger of the single 
gesture). 
 
This approach allows us to fully recover the role of 
modern scientific reason. The reason would assert itself 
precisely because of its capacity of rationalizing the "risk", 
that is, to arrive at a vision of reality from which the 
presence of the authentic "risk" (i.e. the dramatic 
experience of what is not rational and whose power can 
even be perceived as destructive) has been removed.  
 
According to this perspective, in the face of man and 
human society we would find only "dangers": it could also 
be innumerable or very serious dangers, but in any case 
we would always have to deal with a definite and 
determined series of situations. Faced with these, man's 
rationality and scientific-technological capacity are able 
to produce "remedies" and to avoid (or limit) damage. It 
seems clear, in this sense, as the attempts to calculate the 
probability (in mathematics or in statistics), the 
precautionary principle (in sociological and psychological 
domains), the prevention principle (in the field of 
medicine or the environment), and the insurance 
strategies (in economics or finance) consistently converge 
in one direction. 
 
But we must be careful: we are always dealing with 
rational responses elaborated in such a way as to remedy 
what the same reasoning has succeeded in determining: 
that is, to remedy the dangers that reason has at first 
identified, and for which it has then developed the 
appropriate remedy. What is in the background, i.e. 
behind this certain series of certain dangers, is the real 
risk, and is exactly that which the civilization of 
technology so desperately wants to escape. 
 
Humana conditio 
However, as the "risk" - not the "danger"- is 
perceivable in its essence remains the decisive question 
for the man of today. It seems in fact that man today is 
destined to chase the innumerable series of dangers; he is 
doing it with great skill and, at the same time, with great 
satisfaction, demonstrating to himself the strength of his 
scientific rationality and the power of the technology he 
possesses. This really seems to be the humana conditio in 
which progress is expressed and the future of the 
universe is planned.  
 
Optimistically, in spite of himself, Ulrich Beck has 
recently tried to build a model of global society where the 
"risk" of failure is present. In other words, he has 
attempted to outline and explain the interdependence 
framework to which we report the political choices of all 
nations, the ecological decisions, and the cyclical 
economic and social crises. He even proposed a "Critical 
Theory of the Global Risk Society". In it, he gives great 
space to the questions of "responsibility", of political self-
criticism, of the dialectic between progress and 
conservation in the institutions of modernity. In 
conclusion, he presented a refined analysis of the risk 
category that would appear to be the updated 
comprehensive starting point to be used today to find a 
remedy for the situation in which humanity finds itself.  
 
I observe that, once again, we are dealing with the 
result - a very commendable result - of the strategic 
reconfiguration of the "risk" to "danger": i.e. the reduction 
of a condition of understanding and therefore of 
governability of what (and this is the true "risk") remains 
in reality "indeterminable". 
 
To be sure, we must acknowledge that (a) this is the 
fragile contemporary conditio humana, and that (b) 
conditio humana means the existential condition of the 
human subject. This subject, driven by his nature to 
measure himself with what he ignores, projects himself 
always beyond the limit of what, which until now has 
been able to determine and produce, always hovering 
between success and failure. 
         Philosophy & Epistemology International Journal 
 
Maso S. The Philosophical Category of "Risk". Philos Epistemol Int J 2018, 1(1): 000102.              Copyright© Maso S. 
 
4 
What is important now to consider is that chance (or 
fortune or hazard) has not established this status; all that 
happens follows the progressive imposition, in the 
Western world, of a very precise form of rationality: of a 
logos that could transform itself into an epistêmê and a 
technê 4  to counter and defeat any other mode of 
knowledge and action in the world5 [8,9]. 
 
Facing the Risk 
If now we want to try to understand what the modern 
concept of "risk" refers to and therefore what it can really 
imply we need to go back to Greek philosophy and to the 
way it relate to "what is not determined" and therefore "is 
unpredictable", "elusive", "unmanageable". 
 
First, let us look at the word that the Greeks used to 
name what we today call "risk": κίνδυνοσ. The verb 
κινδυνεύειν means "to be in serious danger" in the sense 
of "being in front of a risk" that presents itself in its 
concreteness and inevitability6 [3,6,10]. 
 
It is possible that the first meaning refers to the "test 
of fire", in front of which it is necessary to show one's 
physical or moral strength from which justice is 
promoted. 
                                                             
4On the subject of technê – a central topic in the twentieth-century 
thought on the history of Western man – I refer first of all to the writings 
of Martin Heidegger, starting from the essay The Age of the World Image, 
in Heidegger M. (1952) Holzwege. Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M, which 
dates back to 1938. From a sociological perspective, the research of 
Arnold Gehlen remains decisive: among other things, he highlighted the 
theme of automation in the industrial field: cf. Gehlen A. (2004) Die Seele 
im technischen Zeitalter. Sozialpsychologische Probleme in der 
industriellen Gesellschaft (1957-1971). In Gesamtausgabe, von K.S. 
Rehberg, Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M. 2004, VI, pp. 5-23. 
5Technê and epistêmê are strongly connected. To the traditional and 
probable meaning of epistêmê, from ἐπίςταμαι / ἐφίςτημι ("to lay on", 
"to be placed above": in reference to knowledge or to who owns it), it 
should be added that of technê, whose Indo-European root *tek is also at 
the base of τέκτων (the "craftsman": one who possesses a specific 
competence derived from his experience). With regard to the 
characteristics of epistemic knowledge, Aristotle (Sophistical refutations, 
chapter 34) draws it in reference to the deductive art, emphasizing 
however how this knowledge is based on the ability and possibility of 
finding the "principle". So, the principle is what it is more important than 
anything, and it is also the most difficult thing to achieve, μέγιςτον γὰρ 
ἴςωσ ἀρχὴ παντόσ, ὥςπερ λέγεται. διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον (Soph. el. 183b 
22-23). But once the "principle" is achieved, everything follows. 
6The first meanings, listed in the Liddell-Scott Dictionary, are: "to be 
daring, run risk, make a venture, take a risk, to be in dire peril, to be in 
danger". However, the etymology remains controversial and does not 
seem to have given reliable fruits as regards the Indo-European 
derivation, cf. Chantraine 1983,cit., pp. 532-33; Beekes-Beek 2010, cit., 
pp. 699-700. A pre-Greek or Anatolian origin seems more likely, as 
Semerano G. (1974) Le origini della cultura europea, vol. II, 1: Dizionario 
Della lingua greca. Olschki. Firenze, p. 140, suggests. 
According to Giovanni Semerano (an Italian 
glottologist, who theorized the centrality of the Akkadian 
/ Semitic languages), the κιν component refers to the 
Akkadian kīnu (legitimate), kintu<kittu (justice). But see 
also the Latin cinis (in Greek: κόνισ), the ashes of fire, in 
connection with the Akkadian kinūnum and other 
Mesopotamian languages and the Arabic kānūn: the 
furnace, the brazier where the fire and the ash are found. 
This is followed by the component -δυν-, which, in 
Akkadian dūnu, dunnu means "force", "violence". 
 
We see that this constellation of meanings allows us to 
reconstruct a situation comparable to that of Ulysses, the 
man of great resources (πολύτροποσ), able to find a way 
out on any occasion, capable to escape even from the fire 
(i.e. from extreme danger), by virtue of his faculty to 
"think" for the best. 
 
The hero Diomedes, in the event of being in danger, 
would prefer to be in the company of Ulysses: 
 
«Following him, even from the burning fire (καὶ ἐκ πυρὸσ 
αἰθομένοιο) 
we both would escape, because he knows how to think for 
the best»,  
Iliad 10. 246-7. 
 
The Greek man is always present to the dangers of the 
battle, where he risks death, and the danger of the fire 
that sets the city on fire and causes destruction. Then 
there is the danger of the sea and of navigation7 [7]. The 
Greek man knows that he must be tested continuously 
and that only in this way can he become an expert and 
overcome obstacles. It is not possible to imagine an 
"expert" who has never been put to the test, who has 
never been in a dangerous situation and who, eventually, 
has not activated an action strategy and has not taken any 
personal "decision". 
 
Similarly, we can imagine the situation of the man 
who, faced with the law and the judge, must answer for a 
crime and runs the danger of death: Socrates knows this 
well, defending himself in front of the Athenian court: 
 
«And what, Socrates, will you tell me, do not you 
regret having led a kind of life that, today, puts you in 
danger of death? (ἐξ οὖ κινδυνεύεισ νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν)», 
Plat., Apol. 28b. 
 
Phronesis, the practical intelligence that does not limit 
itself to speculation but instead produces decisions and 
consequent actions, is what saves man from kindynos. 
                                                             
7See Maso (2006) cit., pp. 21-26. 
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Ulysses was in possession of phronesis, as well as 
Socrates; phronesis becomes the reference to which the 
wise man of Aristotle aspires. The work of Aristotle, 
above all the ethical work, is dominated by the presence 
of phronesis, and, consequently, the very possibility that 
the kind of wise man (to whom Aristotle himself thinks8) 
[11] may encounter danger is greatly reduced. Thus, we 
read in the third book of Nicomachean Ethics: 
 
«The great-souled man does not run into danger for 
trifling reasons (μικροκίνδυνοσ), and is not a lover of 
danger (φιλοκίνδυνοσ), because there are few things he 
values; but he will face danger in a great cause 
(μεγαλοκίνδυνοσ), and when so doing (ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ) 
will be ready to sacrifice his life, since he holds that life is 
not worth having at every price». 
Aristot., EN 1124b 6-9 (transl. H. Rackham). 
 
This is a significant passage because it explains that 
the wise man is essentially a measured man: he is not a 
lover of danger or of challenge; even if at times (i.e. when 
he judges that it is worth it) he knows how to put his life 
on the line. But it is important to note that this is one of 
the rare passages of the entire Aristotelian work in which 
the subject of danger is directly addressed9. In order to do 
so, Aristotle had previously (chapters 9-12, Susemihl-
Apelt) put on theme the "courage", ἡ ἀνδρεία, and the 
"brave man", ὁ ἀνδρεῖοσ. Since courage is, above all, 
defined as a "mediety" between fear and temerity 
(μεςότησ ἐςτὶ  περὶ φόβουσ καὶ θάρρη, 1115a6-7). And 
since, courage can manifest itself better in the topical 
circumstances of danger (death and war are also evoked 
in addition to illness and navigation at sea), Aristotle 
considers precisely kindynos the best way to test the man 
who declares himself courageous, and distinguishes 
himself not only from the base (ὁ δειλόσ), but also from 
the rash man (ὁ θραςύσ)10 and the impulsive man (οἱ 
θυμοειδεῖσ). To be decisive, then, is to know how how to 
deal with dangers correctly and swiftly11. 
If someone observes a man who often deals with 
sudden dangers more than is typically expected of a 
                                                             
8On practical wisdom in Aristotle see Natali C. (2001) The Wisdom of 
Aristotle. State University of New York Press, Albany, pp. 39-61. 
9They are altogether less than 100 passages; one third of them belongs 
to the Eudemian Ethics (15) and to the Nicomachean Ethics (17). 
10Aristotle, E.N. 1116a 7-8, defines the rash man in this way: «The rash, 
moreover, are impetuous, and though eager before the danger comes 
(πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων) they hang back at the critical moment». 
11E.N. 1115b 18-19: «The courageous man then is he that endures or 
fears the right things and for the right purpose and in the right manner 
and at the right time, and who shows confidence in a similar way. For 
the courageous man feels and acts as the circumstances merit, and as 
principle may dictate (ὡσ ἂν ὁ λόγοσ)». 
greatly courageous man, it could be replied that this 
depends more on the disposition and character of this 
man (that is, by an accidental circumstance) than his 
conscious preparation 12 . In short, for Aristotle the 
comparison between kindynos and phronesis resolves 
completely in favor of the second: and so because the 
strength of phronesis is such that it greatly reduces the 
possibility that man, courageous or not, comes to be in 
dangerous situations. 
 
The dangerous actions, in practice, tend not to exist as 
such because they can always be framed in a rational 
perspective, able to weaken their disruptive, and at the 
same time worrying power. 
 
More than in Aristotle, the presence of kindynos is, so 
to speak, constant in Plato13 [12]. Unlike what happens 
with Aristotle, to plunge into the dangers and put at risk 
his life and his integrity is, for Plato, decisive. Plato thinks 
that man can experience his value, his technical skills and 
his own wisdom only in conditions of risk14. It is not by 
chance that, next to κίνδυνοσ, the verb τολμᾶν, "dare", 
occurs repeatedly15: this verb evokes the famous cry of 
Prometheus, the hero nailed for punishment to the rock 
by Zeus: 
 
                                                             
12E.N. 1117a 17-22: «Hence it is thought a sign of still greater courage to 
be fearless and undismayed in sudden alarms (ἐν τοῖσ αἰφιδνίοισ 
φόβοισ) than in dangers that were foreseen (ἐν τοῖσ προδήλοισ). Bravery 
in unforeseen danger springs more from character (ἀπὸ ἕξεωσ), as there 
is less time for preparation (ἐκ παραςκευῆσ); one might resolve to face a 
danger one can foresee, from calculation and on principle, but only a 
fixed disposition of courage will enable one to face sudden peril». 
13 See Maso S. (2012) Val la pena rischiare? Qualche osservazione sulla 
categoria filosofica di «rischio» in Platone. "La Ricerca Folklorica" 66: 85-
95. 
14As for the educational function of risk and of testing oneself, it is 
sufficient to remember that this is the central theme of the VII book of 
the Laws, which supports the importance of being educated to "risk". 
This applies to everyone, including women. It would be a great 
misfortune, for the city and its constitution, that women were 
considered by nature inferior and, therefore, they were so shamefully 
educated "that they were not even willing to die and to take any risks 
(πάντασ κινδύνουσ κινδυνεύειν), as do the females of the birds fighting 
for their children against the strongest among the beasts"(Leg. 814B). 
Plato is convinced that in any case we must assume the task and the risk 
of educating the citizen (κινδυνεύειν περὶ τῆσ πολιτείασ). It is necessary 
to bet on the law: and if at first sight such a decision might seem 
analogous to that on which the dice are thrown, in reality, since we 
belong to a civil society, we cannot avoid such an educational 
commitment and not to share the risks (ςυγκινδυνεύειν): Leg. 968E-
969A. 
15Plat., Apol. 39A; Theaet. 196D; Leg. 835C, 976B. In Menex. 240E, 
Aspasia, the noble friend of Socrates and Plato, in his epitaph states that 
the Greeks "dared to face the risks (ἐτόλμηςαν διακινδυνεύειν) of the 
subsequent battles for their own salvation" only because they 
remembered the memory of Marathon. 
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«Nobody opposed Zeus, outside of me; 
I was the one who dared (ἐγὼ  δ᾽ὁ τολμῆσ) to do it, and 
freed the mortals  
from ending up dispersed in Hades. 
That is why these sufferings crook me: 
painful to endure, pitiful to see», 
Aesch., Prom. 235-238. 
 
As Aeschylus points out, Prometheus assumed his 
destiny completely, and decided to share with mortals a 
gift that belonged to the gods. He sought, inside the reed, 
the secret spark of fire, which is the master of every 
technique (διδάςκαλοσ τέχνησ πάςησ, 110-111), and then 
brought it to men. Prometheus was not the only one to 
commit him; other heroes or deities have "dared". For 
example, Ocean, which now consoles Prometheus. But 
Ocean was lucky: no one blames him for anything. He ran 
his risks (τετολμηκὼσ, 331) and came out unscathed. For 
Prometheus, on the contrary, everything is different: to 
him men owe practically everything they know today: 
πᾶςαι τέχναι βροτοῖςιν ἐκ Προμηθέωσ (506). Yet he is 
serving for his daring, at a time when - as Aeschylus 
recognizes - the technique is still "infinitely weaker than 
destiny": τέχνη δ' ἀνάγκησ ἀςθενεςτέρα μακρῶι (514). 
 
Aeschylus is sure that man has a destiny: that of "being 
tested". He explicitly states it in The Libation Bearers, 
when he urges the oracle to say that Orestes "must 
experience danger": χρηςμὸσ κελεύων τόνδε κίνδυνον 
περᾶν (270). 
 
I argue that even in Aeschylus and in the Greek 
tragedy not only has the modern value of "risk" not yet 
been established, but that with kindynos, despite 
everything, we still have to deal with a type of risk (or 
danger) determined 16  [13]. We have to deal with 
something that can, and therefore must, be faced with the 
courage and the audaciousness of our actions and 
decisions, even if it is clear that destiny, behind it, is 
governing. Similarly, in Plato man faces the danger 
because he has been able to recognize, since he is in 
possession of a rational capacity (logos), and because he 
presumes to be able to win, since he is in possession of a 
scientific strategy (technê). Here it is not interesting to 
analyze this aspect in detail: rather, the focus should be 
placed where logos and technê intersect, when the man 
                                                             
16The tragedy expresses in a determined way the obsessions, the 
contradictions, the ambiguities and the dangers to which the Greek polis 
and the social project that supported it are going to meet. What dark 
faults behind? In this direction, the research of Vernant J.P. & Vidal-
Naquet P. (1981), Tragedy and myth in ancient Greece, Harvester 
Brighton (or. ed. 1972), remain fundamental. 
"decides" that he will use logos and technê (i.e. the 
modern science). In myth, as it is evident, Prometheus 
represents precisely this. 
 
But what are the features of this "decision"? Does it 
appear to be consciously aware or does it contain the 
maximum "hazard"? 
 
Once again, it is necessary to point out that we are 
completely far from the concept of the world and the 
"theory of action" developed by Aristotle. We are not 
dealing with the motivated and rational "choice" that, for 
Aristotle, means the ability to decide within different 
possibilities of which the profile has been studied (this is 
the προαίρεςισ); nor with the expression of a "will" 
belonging fully to the subject agent and managed on a 
responsible level17 [14-16].  
 
This last point is particularly delicate because it is 
testimony of the difficulty, in the ancient world, of 
conceiving the decision and the action in reference to the 
assumption of responsibility by the thinking and acting 
subject. The specific word which, in the Greek language of 
Aristotle, refers in some way to the concept of 
"responsibility" is αἴτιον: but αἴτιον means "responsible" 
only as a consequence of the fact that, literally, one is "the 
cause" of something18. 
 
Logos, Technê and Risk 
With Aristotle, that is, in the middle of the 4th century 
BC, the situation is well established: logos and technê are 
in fact the indispensable tools to face the future and plan 
the survival of mankind and the world it inhabits. 
 
Previously, up to Plato - that is in practice, until the 
end of the fifth century BC - the setting was still being 
structured. Not only were daring and courage estimated: 
they were judged to be determining factors when making 
                                                             
17As for the Aristotelian classification of what is voluntary, involuntary, 
forced, necessitated, cf. Eth. Eud. 2, 7-9, 1223a21 - 1225a36. The 
research on the theory of decision and action in the ancient world are 
today in great development. For Aristotle, in particular, I refer to Destrée 
P. (2011) Aristotle on Responsibility for One's Character. In M. Pakaluk & 
G. Pearson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 278-311. More generally, see Dihle 
A. (1982) The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity. University of 
California Press, Berkeley - Los Angeles - London, pp. 20-67, and Frede 
M. (2011) A Free Will. Origins of the Notions in Ancient Thought, Berkeley 
- Los Angeles - London, University of California Press, pp. 19-48. The 
commonly held thesis is that the modern conception of free will, 
connected to the free ability of choice, has been affirmed only in late 
antiquity. 
18The key passage in this regard is the seventh chapter of the book III of 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. 
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decisions. Science and technology were considered 
decisive; yet, observes Socrates in dialogue with Laches 
and with Nicias, how not to take into account that: 
 
«Anyone who agrees to descend into a well, and to 
dive, and to endure in this or other such action, without 
being an adept in these things, you would say is more 
courageous than the adepts (ἀνδρειοτέρουσ φήςεισ τῶν 
ταῦτα δεινῶν) ... And you observe, I suppose, Laches, that 
persons of this sort are more foolish (ἀφρονεςτέρωσ) in 
their risks (κινδυνεύουςιν) and endurances than those 
who do it with proper skill (οἱ μετὰ τέχνησ)», 
Plat., Laches 193C (trad. W.R.M. Lamb). 
 
In this dialogue, Plato himself questions whether the 
courage (ἀνδρεία), instead of being pure and simple, is 
not "science" (ἐπιςτήμη): he means the specific 
«knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared (τὴν τῶν 
δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιςτήμην), either in war or in 
anything else», Lach. 194E. Of course it will be important 
to distinguish the courage (ἀνδρεία) from the lack of fear 
due to ignorance (ἀφοβία), from the temerity (θραςύτησ), 
from the audacity (τόλμα); this can be done when the 
action is combined with the intelligence: 
 
«So you see, the acts that you and most people call 
courageous (ἀνδρεῖα), I call rash (θραςέα), and it is the 
prudent acts (τὰ φρόνιμα) which I speak of that are 
courageous (ἀνδρεῖα)», 
Plat., Laches 197B-C. 
 
Yet Socrates, Nicias and Laches do not agree on a 
definition of courage that is really capable of bringing its 
characteristics back into scientific knowledge. Courage 
not only must be "the knowledge of what is to be dreaded 
or dared", if for "things to dread" we limit ourselves to 
consider future ills and, for "things to be dared", future 
assets. As a science, the courage must however refer to the 
goods and the evils: i.e. in reference to the present as well 
as to the past and the future (199B-C). Should not this be 
the same for "courage"? 
 
Perhaps, as a consequence of this, the Platonic Laches 
is an aporetic dialogue; it does not find a conclusion and 
instead leaves the interlocutors of past and present the 
task of answering the main question: is it or is it not 
absurdity to consider courage a "science"? 
 
If we try to give an answer today, we can perhaps say 
that it will not be absurd to consider courage as a science 
only if we can understand its value and its characteristics 
(which can be associated with the "risk") and envisage it 
in a double perspective. On the one hand, since it belongs 
to "what is to be dreaded or dared" (and therefore refers 
to what is risky to do or decide to do), it demands to be 
defined and considered in a scientific way, so that specific 
countermeasures can be taken in different situations. On 
the other hand, the courage (obviously both to decide and 
to act) is explicitly presented as the "virtue" of the soul. It 
is something that evades specific determination. It is 
precisely because of this that man, at the beginning, began 
to think and reflect in the moment of action, and therefore 
to exist as a man. In other words, it was at that moment 
that the "thought" ventured to abandon its naive original 
form: at that moment, man had the courage to put the 
content of his action and its objectives at the center. In 
practice, the man at that moment intuited and then 
consequently behaved, knowing that the "risk" should 
have been evaluated, calculated, and therefore controlled 
as "danger". 
 
However, behind the decision and action (and the 
"courage to decide and act") is the absolute opening of risk, 
the one that in modern times was grasped by Søren 
Kierkegaard and then by Friedrich Nietzsche. The first 
theorized the direct implication of "risk" and "possibility" 
in a perspective that is juxtaposed to the immediate 
experience of angst. The second probed to the extreme 
the exciting characteristics of the "risk" in his rising on 
the nothingness of existence, to grasp the strength of a 
"risky" and "dancing" life on the chance. Both Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche were able to look directly at the "risk", 
finding themselves, however, to live in an era that had 
already introjected the character of the values of 
technology and its power19. 
Did Plato, and the Greeks before him, manage to look 
at the "risk" in its maximum openness with similar 
lucidity and open-mindedness? 
 
Tragedy and the Openness to the "Risk" of 
Failure and Madness 
My answer is negative: they were certainly the 
architects of the advent of an epistêmê able to define and 
transform the "risk". Yet it has not been canceled but, on 
                                                             
19 See Maso 2006, cit.,pp. 77-84, 91-96 and 183-88. Here it is enough to 
quote § 6 of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in which to the acrobat smashed to 
the ground and dying, Zarathustra kneeling says: «You have made your 
job dangerous (der Gefahr deinen Beruf), and there is nothing in it to 
disdain. Now you perish for your job ». As you know, this acrobat, 
shortly before hanging on a rope stretched over the abyss, is the 
Nietzschean emblem of man: "A dangerous (gefährliches) to go beyond, a 
dangerous (gefährliches) to be on the way, a dangerous (gefährliches) 
looking back, a dangerous (gefährliches) to shudder and stop "(§ 4). Any 
form of rationality in all this would seem to be evocable anyway; the 
problem is that everything seems rather to "dance on the feet of the 
chance", auf den Füssen des Zufalls - tanzen (in the chapter Vor Sonnen-
Aufgang). 
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the contrary, it has remained vital in the background: the 
Greek tragedy supports this theory. Tragedy is the place 
where the opening to the "risk" of failure and madness is, 
for man, extreme. There is really no stage action that, in 
the ritual re-proposition of the myth, does not leave a 
tragic tension: this tension is removed in the background 
but is always able to make salvation or perdition possible. 
For example, we can recall the beginning of Aeschylus' 
Orestea, the anguished tension on the scene when the 
lookout finally sees the long-awaited signal: the distant 
torch light that warns of the conclusion of the Trojan war. 
It seems that this is the moment to forget (or see 
removed) the punishment that has affected the palace of 
Agamemnon and his people for over ten years. The 
moment of joy should explode, but everything remains 
pending awaiting the king's arrival. But in a transitory 
passage the chorus recalls what no one seems to have in 
mind at the time: what Agamemnon dared to put into 
action, the act of daring most daringly (τὸ παντότολμον) 
to propitiate the wind favorable to ships, i.e. how he 
decided to sacrifice his daughter. It seems that a wretched 
and unfortunate madness (αἰςχρόμητισ τάλαινα 
παρακοπἀ), a madness that is always the first cause of 
subsequent misfortunes (πρωτοπήμων), makes the 
audacious mortals (βροτοὺσ θραςύνει), vv. 218-23, ready 
to run towards the most dramatic and dangerous destiny 
reserved for them. By contrast, Clytemnestra walks 
happily on the threshold of the palace, throwing out 
shouts of joy (ἀνωλόλυξα, 587: it is the first word that she 
pronounces) waiting to welcome her husband, while she 
is perfectly aware of the uxoricide she intends to do. 
Agamemnon, however, is accompanied by Cassandra, the 
foreign soothsayer now his slave. The chorus still points 
out that the situation is not resolved and that, on the 
contrary, everything is at risk: "terror (δεῖμα) persistently 
twirls before the heart full of fatal omens", 975-7. 
Cassandra, when she finally opens her mouth, only throws 
shouts of horror; then, announces the imminent new 
great misfortune (νέον ἄχοσ ... μέγα κακόν, 1101-2) and 
sees in advance the repeated series of blows of the ax 
with which Agamemnon will be killed. She sees what will 
be the boldness (τολμᾶι) of Clitemnestra, the woman who 
kills the male, 1231. 
Finally, destiny is truly accomplished. As the chorus 
once again emphasizes, every action is a consequence 
and, in turn, causes new action. Whoever decides to act - 
and in doing so demonstrates to accept destiny - 
inevitably suffers the consequences: "it is certain that, as 
long as Zeus is steadfast in his throne, he who acts 
undergoes", μίμνει δὲ μίμνοντοσ ἐν θρόνωι Διὸσ παθεῖν 
τὸν ἔρξαντα (1563-1564). 
 
In a perspective of this kind, the original act - that is, 
the first risk decision - seems to fade into the distance. 
Thus, on the one hand, in parallel with the story of 
Iphigenia, it also evokes that of Thyestes (brother of 
Atreus, the father of Agamemnon) and of his son Aegistus: 
and it is with the help of Aegistus that Clytemnestra 
makes his revenge. On the other hand – and Clytemnestra 
recalls this in the finale of the tragedy – "it was necessary 
that we acted as we did", χρὴν τάδ' ὡσ ἐπράξαμεν (1659). 
Under the banner of a destiny that everything seems to 
have determined, the life of the Greek man appears to be 
resolved in the rhythm of unavoidable decisions: a sort of 
relatively unpredictable moves and countermoves, of 
which however we could clearly retrace the causal chain. 
This chain, however, is only hinted at because it is 
continuously removed: only if fully illuminated could it 
lead back to the original and risky decision to act. 
 
Something similar happens in the tragedy of Medea. 
Medea's decision to kill her rival (Jason's new wife) and 
her own children fits into an assigned destiny, and of this 
she is conscious as she is intimately aware that passion is 
stronger than reason. He had not accidentally answered 
the servant who had brought her the news of his rival's 
death: "Everything that happens is necessary, old man. 
The gods and I, in my madness, have hatched all this", 
πολλή μ᾽ ἀνάγκη, πρέςβυ· ταῦτα γὰρ θεοὶ / κἀγὼ κακῶσ 
φρονοῦς᾽ἐμηχανηςάμην (1013-4). So, in the background, 
there is a necessity, but still deeper lies the possibility of 
risking to exist and to act within this necessity: to face the 
dangers which our life, and the decisions it implies, make 
inevitable. 
 
In the Greek tragedy, we have 39 evidences of 
κίνδυνοσ and of the words built on its root. Excluding 
fragments in which the significance of meaning is not 
perspicuous, they are so distributed: Aeschylus = 4, 
Sophocles = 3, Euripides = 2320. Obviously, the privileged 
meaning is the most general one that is found in the 
expression: "to run risk". However, Sophocles already 
combines risk with thought (for example in Ant. 502) and, 
significantly, it makes Philoctetes say: 
 
«You, who save me, take pity on me and look at how 
many distressing dangers (πάντα δεινὰ κἀπικινδύνωσ) 
stand there waiting for mortals, and some will be bearable 
well, others badly. It is necessary that, as soon as one is 
out of suffering, he will look in the face what is frightening. 
If instead the life is good, we will have to watch over it so 
that it does not go wrong without us realizing it», 
                                                             
20Aesch.,Th. 1028, 1048; Agam. 883; Choeph. 270. Soph., Ant..42; Phil. 
502; Oed. Col. 564. Eurip. Cycl. 352, 654; Med. 248; Heraclid.148, 454, 
504, 758; Hipp.1019; Andr.86; Hec.5, 244; Suppl. 572; Iphig.Taur. 90, 
1001, 1022; Phoen.723, 1080, 1229, 1026; Or. 1159; Iphig.Aul. 17; 
Rhes.154, 588. 
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Soph., Phil. 501-6. 
 
The ability of "looking" is opposed to the worrisome 
and distressing living conditions, to pain and to what 
frightens man.“Looking” means: to start a rational 
mechanism of "foresight", knowing that risks are by their 
nature inevitable and must be faced by man (ἤθληςα 
κινδυνεύματα, 564). 
 
Later, with Euripides, the feeling of "having come to 
the threshold of a serious danger" (so, for example, in 
Cycl. 352: ἀφῖγμαι κἀπὶ κινδύνου βάθρα) is admitted as 
an eventuality and Odysseus, in Hec. 244, is perfectly 
aware of having slipped into a situation that he himself 
defines as serious (ἐσ κίνδυνον ἐλθόντεσ). Of course, it 
seems that the risk may, in a certain sense, be embracing 
or not embracing as one chooses, as when (in Heraclid. 
503-4) the protagonist asks himself if he is or is not able 
to decide about it (κίνδυνον  ἡμῶν  οὕνεκ᾽  αἴρεςθαι  
μέγαν). Yet, from the attitude that, in the face of κίνδυνοσ, 
the individual subject holds, a life conduct can result 
where its threat appears mitigated: it is the case of 
Heraclid. 454 (μήτε κινδύνευε), 758 (κίνδυνον τεμεῖν); of 
Hipp.1019 (κίνδυνόσ τ ἀπὼν); of Iph. Aul. 28 (ἀκίνδυνον 
βίον). It is not, however, that the problem can be solved 
definitively21 in this way - that is, focusing on an adequate 
life strategy - since the true risk (that is, the risk that lies 
behind the very possibility of acting and thinking) belongs 
to the ultimate background of man's existence and 
reflection on being. Because of this, we have the 
impression that, despite the reasoned approach to the 
different forms of danger, the underground tension 
remains. In the Phoenician Women (the tragedy focused 
on the story of Eteocles and Polynices), this element is 
immediately graspable: the deaths follow one after the 
other at a fast pace in the most complete incumbent of 
pathos. Creon's son, Menecaeus, throws himself from the 
walls of Thebes for the salvation of his fatherland; 
Eteocles and Polynices die by the hand of each other; 
Jocasta, their mother, kills herself on their bodies; all the 
chiefs of the Argives, who had fought against Thebes, die;  
 
 
                                                             
21This is also the case of Iphigenia and Orestes. Orestes declares himself 
willing to run to the end his risks (κίνδυνον ἐκπλήςαντα, Iphig, Taur. 90) 
to take the statue of Artemis, as advised by the oracle. In this way he can 
take his sister Iphigenia with him, held in Tauris, by ship. It is a risk that 
Iphigeneia defines "beautiful", τὸ κινδύνευμα γίγνεται καλόν, 1001), but 
probably useless. Orestes insists: it is a risk to be attempted anyway 
(κινδυνευτέον, 1022), even if Iphigenia intends to refuse, while admiring 
the courage (πρόθυμον, 1023) of the brother. 
Polynices is left unburied while Oedipus is driven out of 
Thebes along with Antigone22. 
 
One of the messengers seems to anticipate all this to 
Jocasta, suggesting to the hopeless mother the weight of 
the imminent destiny: 
«If you still have some energy to oppose or words of 
wisdom  
or some enchantment, come forward and hold your 
children  
from a frightful duel. A great danger looms (ὁ κίνδυνοσ 
μέγασ)   
and frightening is the prize of the race: you will have 
nothing but tears,  
as private as you will be on this day of two children», 
Euripid., Phoen. 1259-63. 
 
In short, here too, as more generally in the context of 
the Greek tragedy, tension develops and manifests itself 
between the games of destiny - which has failure and 
death as inevitable epilogues - and the courage or 
willingness to go towards it. The risk is evidently the 
condition in which the individual man arises when he 
decides to face his destiny23 . And this condition is 
certainly with heroic implications: it allows the same man 
to look directly at his own existence and his own death, to 
understand the connection with nature in its most radical 
depth, to hypothesize decisions and actions for which 
guilt and responsibility will be attributed to him.  
 
As we have seen, only at this point do phronêsis and 
technê come into play. They are the two most powerful 
means that the western man has available to (a) manage 
the situation of absolute uncertainty and risk in which the 
humana conditio has placed him; (b) definitively 
transform the insane risk into concrete "determined" 
danger; and (c) convert the ancient hero into the modern 
man, the master of technique and at the center of rational 
society. Ultimately, we are faced with the philosophical 
thought that is imposed in its definitive yet paradoxical 
form: the form for which the risk is not denied, but rather 
the inevitability is confirmed. Is it therefore correct to 
                                                             
22The theme of "transgression", implicit within the philosophical 
category of "risk", finds its maximum exemplification in Antigone's 
decision not to leave his brother unburied, in opposition to the law of 
the city of Thebes and the will of Creon. 
23Certainly in the background lies destiny, and therefore the situation is 
summarized in formula: B=da+i «high-risk behavior», in which the 
subject plays with instability and puts its own security at risk. However, 
the hero decides something, and then becomes in some way the 
protagonist of a dangerous action. As we know, a «dangerous path» 
implies that the objective insecurity (i) of a X route (T) is made clear by 
the decision (d) of acting (a) by a certain subject S. Practically Ti  Sdat. 
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conclude by saying that risk has established itself as the 
authentic soul of the Western world? [17,18]. 
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